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Schwartz and Appel: Where's the Beef?

WHERE’S THE BEEF?: A GUIDE TO JUDGES ON PREEMPTION
OF STATE TORT LITIGATION INVOLVING BRANDED DRUGS*
Victor E. Schwartz** and Christopher E. Appel***

The U.S. Supreme Court has issued several decisions since 2009
that clarify the landscape for when a state tort claim against a
pharmaceutical manufacturer is preempted.1 Generally speaking,
claimants are permitted to bring lawsuits under state law alleging a
defect in the design or warnings associated with a branded drug
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but are barred
from bringing such claims with respect to an FDA-approved generic
drug.2 The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions in the case of
branded drugs where a claim may be impliedly preempted, including
where a pharmaceutical manufacturer shows “clear evidence” that the
FDA would not have approved a proffered change to the branded
drug’s warning label.3
In 2019, the Court in Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht4
added to its preemption jurisprudence by examining what constitutes
“clear evidence” and how that decision must be made. The Court
responded to lower federal and state courts struggling over how to
apply this language and rendered new, significant guidelines with
respect to when preemption is an available defense for branded drug
manufacturers.5 Critically, the Court made explicit that the question
of whether clear evidence exists that the FDA would not have
approved a warning change “is a legal one for the judge, not a jury.”6
* This Article is dedicated to the memory of University of Cincinnati College of Law Professor John
Murphy. Professor Murphy’s teachings inspired generations of students and his lessons will continue
with them always.
** Victor E. Schwartz co-chairs Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.’s Washington, D.C.-based Public Policy
Group. He coauthors the most widely-used torts casebook in the United States, PROSSER, WADE &
SCHWARTZ’S TORTS (14th ed. 2020). Mr. Schwartz received his B.A. summa cum laude from Boston
University and his J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia University.
*** Christopher E. Appel is an Of Counsel in Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P.’s Washington, D.C.-based
Public Policy Group. He received his B.S. from the University of Virginia’s McIntire School of
Commerce and his J.D. from Wake Forest University School of Law.
1. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009); Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604 (2011);
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011); Mutual Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 570 U.S. 472 (2013); see
also infra Part I.A.
2. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 555; Mensing, 564 U.S. at 604.
3. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571.
4. 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019).
5. See, e.g., In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 282 (3d. Cir.
2017) (stating that “clear evidence” exception created a “cryptic and open-ended” standard for which
“lower courts have struggled to make it readily administrable”), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
6. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1679.
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The Court further clarified the legal requirements for a branded drug
manufacturer to successfully assert such a preemption defense, namely
that “it fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning
required by state law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug
manufacturer that the FDA would not approve changing the drug’s
label to include that warning.”7
This Article examines the Court’s decision in Albrecht and new
issues expected to arise as lower courts interpret it. The Article’s goal
is to assist judges and others as to whether a branded drug
manufacturer has made a sufficient showing, for preemption purposes,
that the FDA’s action or inaction provides clear evidence that the
agency would not approve a warning change. Part I discusses the
Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence regarding pharmaceutical
products to provide an overview of the legal environment in which
Albrecht was decided. It then examines the Albrecht decision. Part II
analyzes outstanding issues in the wake of Albrecht and suggests how
they should be resolved. It further discusses judges’ required branded
drug preemption analysis. Part III examines the role of preemption
regarding FDA-approved drugs now and in the future.
The Article concludes that the Supreme Court opened the door in
Albrecht to potentially broader availability of branded drug
preemption. The Court’s decision to vest the authority to make
preemption determinations in the pharmaceutical context exclusively
with judges, as well as other statements, reflect the notion that
preemption should be available where the FDA has directly or
indirectly rejected a proposed warning change after receiving all of the
material drug information. In that regard, and to give full effect to the
Court’s decision, judges should avoid an overly rigid or inflexible
approach to preemption determinations regarding branded drugs.
I. U.S. SUPREME COURT’S KEY PHARMACEUTICAL PREEMPTION
DECISIONS
A. Overview of Preemption Landscape

The U.S. Supreme Court began to clarify the circumstances in which
tort claims against a pharmaceutical manufacturer are preempted in its
landmark 2009 ruling in Wyeth v. Levine.8 Wyeth addressed a major
threshold issue in pharmaceutical litigation of whether a patient’s
claim that a branded drug contained an inadequate warning under state
7. Id. at 1678.
8. 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
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law was preempted where the FDA specifically approved the warning.
The precise issues involved whether the branded drug manufacturer
could comply with both the FDA’s labeling requirements and state
common law warning requirements as determined by a jury, or
whether these competing requirements presented an “unacceptable
obstacle” or “impossibility” that impliedly preempted the state claim. 9
The Court held that these types of “conflict preemption” do not
categorically bar a state failure-to-warn claim because a branded drug
manufacturer may “unilaterally strengthen its warning,” and therefore
(at least theoretically) comply with competing federal and state
requirements, pursuant to an FDA regulation.10 That regulation, called
the “changes being effected” (CBE) regulation, permits a branded drug
manufacturer to “add or strengthen” its warning by filing a
supplemental application with the FDA.11 The Court explained that
because the branded drug manufacturer “need not wait for FDA
approval” to proceed in changing its warning pursuant to the CBE
regulation, it is not impossible for the manufacturer to comply with
federal law and the potential state law warning requirements as
determined by juries across fifty states.12 The Court recognized that
“some state-law claims might well frustrate the achievement of
congressional objectives,” but maintained that “Congress did not
intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug
safety and effectiveness.”13
In reaching this decision, the Court appreciated that “the FDA
retains authority to reject labeling changes made pursuant to the CBE
regulation in its review of the manufacturer’s supplemental
application.”14 The Court explained that a branded drug manufacturer
could successfully claim it could not comply with both federal and
state warning requirements in a situation in which there was “clear
evidence that the FDA would not have approved a change” in
warning.15 As discussed in the introduction, this exception is the
predicate for the Court’s decision in Albrecht.
In 2011, the Court, in Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing,16 examined preemption
in the context of FDA-approved generic drugs. Here, the Court
reached the opposite conclusion with respect to preemption of a state

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 563, 573 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 560, 573.
Id. at 568 (quoting 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), (C) (2008)).
Id.
Id. at 575, 581.
Id. at 571.
Id.
564 U.S. 604 (2011).
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failure-to-warn claim, finding federal law created “impossibility” for
a generic drug manufacturer to unilaterally change its warning to
comply with potentially different state law requirements.17
Specifically, the Court stated that pursuant to Congress’s 1984
enactment of the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act, commonly called the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, a generic
drug’s FDA approval is contingent upon “showing equivalence” with
an FDA-approved branded drug; a legal requirement for which the
generic drug manufacturer “is responsible for ensuring that its warning
label is the same as the brand name’s.”18
The Court found that this “sameness” requirement applies to any
warning label changes after the FDA’s initial approval.19 Therefore,
unlike in Wyeth where the Court determined that the CBE regulation
enabled a branded drug manufacturer to unilaterally change an FDAapproved warning, a generic drug manufacturer could not do so under
the CBE process. The Court explained that the FDA had likewise
interpreted its regulations “to require that the warning labels of a
brand-name drug and its generic copy must always be the same,” and
that this agency interpretation should be controlling.20
As the Court further recognized, “generic drug manufacturers have
different federal drug labeling duties” to promote the separate public
policy of allowing “manufacturers to develop generic drugs
inexpensively.”21 The “special, and different, regulation of generic
drugs” has also proven successful in “bringing more drugs more
quickly and cheaply to the public” and expanding the generic drug
market22––a market that in 2018 accounted for around 85% of U.S.
drug prescriptions.23
Nevertheless, the Court remained mindful that, from plaintiffs’
perspective, a regime generally allowing state failure-to-warn claims
against branded drug manufacturers and barring state failure-to-warn
claims against generic drug manufacturers “makes little sense.”24 It
declined, however, to “distort the Supremacy Clause in order to create
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 618.
Id. at 612-13.
Id. at 613.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 612-13.
Id. at 626.
See Matej Mikulic, Branded vs. Generic U.S. Drug Prescriptions Dispensed 2005-2018,
STATISTA (Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/205042/proportion-of-brand-to-genericprescriptions-dispensed/; see also Generic Drug Facts, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 1, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/generic-drugs/generic-drug-facts (reporting findings of IMS Health Institute
study that “generic drugs saved the U.S. health care system $1.67 trillion from 2007 to 2016”).
24. Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 625 (2011).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss3/1

4

Schwartz and Appel: Where's the Beef?

2021]

WHERE’S THE BEEF?

601

similar pre-emption across a dissimilar statutory scheme[,]” and
acknowledged that “Congress and the FDA retain the authority to
change the law and regulations if they so desire.”25
The Court further illuminated the pharmaceutical preemption
landscape in 2011 in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, LLC.26 Here, the Court
determined that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986,
which created a no-fault compensation program “to stabilize the
vaccine market and facilitate compensation” for legitimate vaccine
injury claims, expressly preempted all design defect claims against
vaccine manufacturers.27 In doing so, the Court recognized that the
Act’s vaccine design improvement and compensation provisions
“reflect[] a sensible choice to leave complex epidemiological
judgments about vaccine design to the FDA and the National Vaccine
Program rather than juries.”28
In 2013, the Court, in Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. Inc. v. Bartlett,29
addressed preemption for generic drug manufacturers with respect to
design defect claims. It determined that the same “impossibility” at
issue in PLIVA preventing generic drug manufacturers from
unilaterally changing the FDA-approved warning copied from the
equivalent branded drug applied to changing the design of an FDAapproved generic drug.30 The Court explained that the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act (FDCA) “requires a generic drug to have the same
active ingredients, route of administration, dosage form, strength, and
labeling as the brand-name drug on which it is based,” and that
redesigning the composition of a generic drug would necessarily result
in a new drug compound that would require a New Drug Application
(NDA) to be marketed and sold.31 Accordingly, the Court determined
that a “straightforward application of pre-emption law” bars any
design defect claim against a generic drug manufacturer.32
The Court’s precedents establish multiple areas in which state tort
claims against a pharmaceutical manufacturer are preempted by
25. Id. at 626.
26. 562 U.S. 223 (2011).
27. Id. at 228.
28. Id. at 239.
29. 570 U.S. 472 (2013).
30. See id. at 484-86.
31. Id. at 483-84. The Court additionally rejected the notion, advanced in a dissenting opinion by
Justice Sotomayor and in the decision below by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, that a
generic drug manufacturer could escape the impossibility of complying with both its federal- and statelaw duties by choosing not to make the drug at all. See id. at 488-89. As the Court explained, “if the
option of ceasing to act defeated a claim of impossibility, impossibility pre-emption would be ‘all but
meaningless,’” and it would also mean that PLIVA and “the vast majority—if not all—of the cases in
which the Court has found impossibility pre-emption, were wrongly decided.” Id.
32. Id. at 493.
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federal law. Specifically, claims alleging either a design or warning
defect in an FDA-approved generic drug are preempted, as are any
product liability claims alleging injury from a vaccine. Relatedly, the
Court, in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., which was decided in 2008 a year
before Wyeth, found that claims related to medical devices given
premarket approval by the FDA are expressly preempted pursuant to
the Medical Device Amendments of 1976.33 Only with respect to
branded drugs that comprise around 10% of U.S. drug prescriptions is
a preemption defense generally not available to the manufacturer.34 It
is against this backdrop that the Court decided Albrecht.
B. The U.S. Supreme Court Clarifies the Law Regarding Branded Drug
Preemption

Albrecht involved claims by more than 500 individuals who took
the branded drug Fosamax, which is approved by the FDA to treat and
prevent osteoporosis in postmenopausal women.35 They alleged
Fosamax’s FDA-approved warning label before 2011 was defective in
failing to adequately warn of the drug’s risk of injury from “atypical
femoral fractures” (i.e. fractures of the femur bone).36 Fosamax’s
manufacturer, Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. (Merck), defended the
failure-to-warn claims, which were brought under the law of multiple
states and consolidated in a multi-district litigation (MDL) action, on
the basis that the FDA considered and rejected efforts by Merck to add
a specific warning about Fosamax’s risk of causing bone “stress
fractures.”37 This rejection, Merck argued, provided “clear evidence”
the FDA would not approve a warning change, entitling the company
to a preemption defense under the exception set forth in Wyeth.
Fosamax was approved by the FDA in 1995 without a warning
referencing a risk of bone fractures.38 As far back as 1990, when
Fosamax was undergoing preapproval clinical trials, Merck’s
scientists expressed concern that Fosamax could at least theoretically
inhibit bone remodeling, which is the process through which bones are
continuously broken down and built back up again, to a degree that
would cause bone fractures.39 Merck brought these concerns to the
FDA’s attention when the company applied for approval of Fosamax,
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
See Mikulic, supra note 23.
Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1673-75 (2019).
Id. at 1674.
Id. at 1668, 1675.
Id. at 1674.
Id.
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but the FDA, “perhaps because the concerns were only theoretical,”
approved Fosamax’s warning label without requiring any mention of
this risk.40
In the decade following Fosamax’s approval, Merck began
receiving adverse event reports from the medical community
indicating that individuals who had taken Fosamax for more than five
years were suffering atypical femoral fractures.41 Merck and others in
the medical community began analyzing this adverse event data and
additional case studies and scholarship examining possible
connections between long-term Fosamax use and bone fractures.42 By
2008, Merck believed there was sufficient evidence to support
additional warnings for prescribing physicians, and applied to the FDA
for preapproval to change Fosamax’s label.43 Merck did so by
submitting Prior Approval Supplement (PAS) applications to the
agency which presented data, analyses and other information to
support proposed labeling changes.44
Specifically, Merck proposed including in the “Precautions” section
of Fosamax’s label, under the heading “Low-Energy Femoral Shaft
Fracture,” a discussion of reported bone stress fractures occurring in
the absence of trauma.45 Merck additionally proposed referencing the
potential for “low-energy femoral shaft fracture” in the “Adverse
Reactions” section of Fosamax’s label.46 The FDA approved the
addition to the Adverse Reactions section, but rejected Merck’s
proposed change to the Precautions section.47 The agency explained
that the proposed change to the Precautions section lacked adequate
justification in the relevant medical literature.48
Merck subsequently resolved in 2008 to effectuate changes to
Fosamax’s label through the CBE process. It adopted the proposed
changes to the Adverse Reactions section with which the FDA
expressed agreement, but did not adopt the proposed changes to the
Precautions section with which the FDA expressed disagreement.49
Such agency disagreement also continued for several additional years.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. Id.; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b) (discussing Prior Approval Supplement (PAS) criteria).
45. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-08(JAP)(LHG), 2014 WL
1266994, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2014), vacated, 852 F.3d 268 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1668
(2019).
46. Id.; Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1674.
47. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1674.
48. Id.; see also In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d at 277.
49. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1674.
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For instance, in 2010, the FDA issued a Drug Safety Communication
in which it stated that “[a]t this point, the data that FDA has reviewed
have not shown a clear connection between bisphosphonate [Fosamax]
use and a risk of atypical subtrochanteric femur fractures.”50 The FDA
stated, however, that it was “working closely with outside experts,
including members of the . . . American Society of Bone and Mineral
Research Subtrochanteric Femoral Fracture Task Force, to gather
additional information that may provide more insight.”51
In 2011, the FDA ordered a change to Fosamax’s label based on its
own analysis, notwithstanding the agency’s continued doubts about
the existence of a causal relationship between the drug and potential
injury.52 Merck again proposed warning language referencing bone
“stress fractures,” but the FDA decided to expressly reference
“[a]typical”, “low-energy”, or low trauma fractures of the femoral
shaft to communicate the “seriousness” of the type of injury that could
result.53 Merck and the FDA ultimately agreed to add a brief,
approximately 200-word discussion of atypical femoral fractures to the
Warnings and Precautions section of Fosamax’s more than 12,000word label (totaling 23 pages of physician prescribing and warning
information).54
Individuals who took Fosamax between 1999 and 2010 sued Merck
for failing to warn about a risk of atypical femoral fractures. The MDL
court rejected this argument, finding the claims preempted.55 It
explained that the “evidence surrounding whether the FDA felt that a
label change was necessary . . . provides clear evidence that the FDA
would have rejected a stronger Precautions warning because the FDA

50. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., 2014 WL 1266994, at *4 (internal
citation omitted).
51. Id.
52. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1675; In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852
F.3d 268, 278 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1668 (2019) (stating that FDA “reiterated that it was
still ‘not clear if bisphosphonates are the cause’” of atypical unusual femur fractures in the agency’s
October 2010 announcement of a pending warning label change).
53. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1674-75 (internal citations omitted).
54. Id..; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., REF. ID 3083184, FOSAMAX FULL PROSCRIBING INFORMATION
(Feb.
2012),
available
at
https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2012/021575s017lbl.pdf.. As the Court explained
in Albrecht:
Although we commonly understand a drug's “label” to refer to the sticker affixed to a prescription
bottle, in this context the term refers more broadly to the written material that is sent to the
physician who prescribes the drug and the written material that comes with the prescription bottle
when the drug is handed to the patient at the pharmacy . . . . These (often lengthy) package inserts
contain detailed information about the drug's medical uses and health risks.
139 S. Ct. at 1672-73 (internal citations omitted).
55. In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium): Prods. Liab. Litig., 2014 WL 1266994, at *16.
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did reject a stronger Precautions warning.”56 The court further
determined that had Merck used the CBE process to unilaterally adopt
its proposed warning about bones stress fractures––again in a proposed
section titled “Low-Energy Femoral Shaft Fracture”––the company
would have been subject to liability for misbranding.57
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
preemption ruling of the MDL court, making several, ultimately
incorrect interpretations of Wyeth’s “clear evidence” exception along
the way.58 First, the court determined that “the term ‘clear evidence’
refers solely to the applicable standard of proof,” which requires the
branded drug manufacturer to “prove that it is highly probable that the
FDA would not have approved a change to the drug’s label.”59 Second,
the court determined that “the ultimate question of whether the FDA
would have rejected a label change is a question of fact for the jury
rather than for the court.”60 Therefore, the court concluded it could
only affirm the decision of the MDL court upon a finding that “no
reasonable juror could conclude that it is anything less than highly
probable that the FDA would have rejected Plaintiff’s proposed
atypical-fracture warning had Merck proposed it to the FDA.”61
In articulating this “demanding and fact-sensitive” standard, the
court acknowledged that juries would need to perform a preemption
“assessment [that] is certainly complex.”62 It argued, however, that
requiring a jury to evaluate and make inferences regarding
“correspondence, agency statements, contemporaneous medical
literature, the requirements of the CBE regulation, and whatever
intuitions the factfinder may have about administrative inertia and
agency decision-making processes” involves an assessment “little
different from the type of fact questions that are routinely given to a
jury.”63 The court also asserted that this complex assessment “does
not require any special legal competence or training.”64 It further
opined that having juries determine whether a branded drug
manufacturer satisfies such a standard in light of the FDA’s regulatory
framework “will not drastically change how defendants will litigate

56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. Id. at *3-4, *16.
58. See In re Fosamax (Alendronate Sodium) Prods. Liab. Litig., 852 F.3d 268, 268 (3d Cir. 2017),
vacated, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019).
59. Id. at 282, 295 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 282.
61. Id. at 295.
62. Id. at 271, 293.
63. Id. at 293, 289.
64. Id. 293.
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the preemption defense.”65
The U.S. Supreme Court took the opportunity in accepting review
in Albrecht to clear up some misconceptions, by the Third Circuit and
other lower courts, about the “clear evidence” exception. First, the
Court, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice Breyer, explained
that the exception was never intended to set forth a heightened
evidentiary standard, or any evidentiary standard, for pharmaceutical
preemption determinations.66 Rather, the Court’s reference to “clear
evidence” in Wyeth simply described a need for clarity regarding
“whatever the means the FDA uses to exercise its authority” in
communicating disapproval of a proposed change to a drug’s
warning.67
Second, and relatedly, the Court stated that the
“complexity” inherent to the “nature and scope” of the FDA’s
determinations, including the alleged disapproval of a proposed
warning change, means “the question is a legal one for the judge, not
a jury.”68
As the Court explained, “judges are better suited than are juries to
understand and to interpret agency decisions in light of the governing
statutory and regulatory context.”69 “Judges,” the Court continued,
“are experienced in ‘[t]he construction of written instruments,’ such as
those normally produced by a federal agency to memorialize its
considered judgments,” and “are normally familiar with principles of
administrative law.”70
The Court also reasoned that placing
pharmaceutical preemption determinations exclusively with judges
“should produce greater uniformity among courts; and greater
uniformity is normally a virtue when a question requires a
determination concerning the scope and effect of federal agency
action.”71 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the “’better
positioned’ decisionmaker is the judge” with respect to whether the
“clear evidence” exception is satisfied.72
The Court additionally clarified judges’ required preemption
analysis regarding the existence of “clear evidence.” The Court stated
that “’clear evidence’ is evidence that shows the court that the drug
manufacturer fully informed the FDA of the justifications for the
warning required by state law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 294.
See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679 (2019).
Id.
Id. at 1679-80.
Id. at 1680.
Id. (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996)).
Id.
Id.
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drug manufacturer that the FDA would not approve a change to the
drug’s label to include that warning.”73 The Court recognized that
federal law permits the FDA to communicate its disapproval of a
warning in a variety of ways, including notice-and-comment
rulemaking setting forth labeling standards, formally rejecting a
warning label that would have been adequate under state law, or other
agency action carrying the force of law.74 The Court also made clear
that the question of the FDA’s “disapproval ‘method’” was not before
the Court, stating only that the “means must lie within the scope of the
authority Congress has lawfully delegated.”75 It explained further that
“the judge must simply ask himself or herself whether the relevant
federal and state laws ‘irreconcilably conflic[t]’” in reviewing
whatever “method” the FDA expressed disapproval.76
Two concurring opinions offered widely divergent views on how
lower courts might apply the “clear evidence” exception. Justice
Thomas authored a concurring opinion endorsing a narrow view of
what expressions of FDA disapproval of a warning change would be
sufficient to demonstrate impossibility and preempt a state failure-towarn claim against the branded drug manufacturer.77 He dismissed the
basic notion that the “FDA would have rejected a hypothetical labeling
change submitted via the CBE process” because “neither agency
musings nor hypothetical future rejections constitute pre-emptive
‘Laws’ under the Supremacy Clause.”78 In his view, preemption could
only be obtainable where the FDA has issued a final ruling rejecting a
manufacturer’s application to change a warning or has issued a
supplemental ruling formally rejecting a warning change made
unilaterally by the manufacturer pursuant to the CBE process. 79
Because Merck withdrew its preapproval applications to implement a
warning change via the CBE process––a responsive action to the
FDA’s expressed disapproval––and did not include in the CBE
application the proposed changes to Fosamax’s “Precautions” section
for which the FDA expressed disapproval, Justice Thomas concluded
there had been no final agency action precluding Merck’s compliance
with federal and state law requirements.80
Justice Alito, in a concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1672.
Id. at 1679.
Id.
Id. (quoting Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
See id. at 1681-83 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1682.
See id. at 1682-83.
See id.
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Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh, advanced a more pragmatic approach
to whether a branded drug manufacturer can successfully claim
preemption under the “clear evidence” exception.81 He emphasized
the “real world” nature of a branded drug manufacturer’s dealings with
the FDA, whereby “if the FDA declines to require a label change
despite having received and considered information regarding a new
risk, the logical conclusion is that the FDA determined that a label
change was unjustified.”82 Justice Alito was especially troubled by
what he felt was a “one-sided account” by the majority of the Court of
the case facts which downplayed the “extensive communication
between Merck and the FDA during the relevant period.”83
In particular, Justice Alito detailed multiple communications
between the FDA and Merck in which the agency expressed its
disapproval of a proposed change to Fosamax’s warning. These
communications included a phone conversation in 2008, while
Merck’s application to change Fosamax’s label was pending, in which
an FDA official purportedly told Merck that “[t]he conflicting nature
of the literature does not provide a clear path forward, and more time
will be need[ed] for FDA to formulate a formal opinion on the issue of
a precaution around these data.”84 They also included an email from
another FDA official about a week later stating “the FDA would ‘close
out’ Merck’s applications if Merck ‘agree[d] to hold off on the
[Precautions] language at this time.’”85 That communication further
indicated that the FDA “would then work with . . . Merck to decide on
language for a [Precautions] atypical fracture language, if it is
warranted.”86
Such communications, combined with the FDA’s Safety
Announcement issued months later stating that the agency reviewed
the data and found no “clear connection” to a risk of atypical femoral
fractures, supported the “logical conclusion” that the FDA would not
have approved a change in warning.87 Justice Alito also found it telling
that “the Safety Announcement concluded by admonishing healthcare
professionals to ‘continue to follow the recommendations in the drug
label when prescribing oral bisphosphonates’ [e.g., Fosamax] and
patients to ‘not stop taking their medication unless told to do so by

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See id. at 1684-86 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1684.
Id. at 1685.
Id. (quoting internal Merck memorandum describing call provided as part of case record).
Id. at 1685-86 (quoting case record).
Id. at 1686 (quoting case record).
Id. (quoting FDA Safety Announcement).
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their healthcare professional.’”88 He additionally noted that “the FDA
itself, speaking through the Solicitor General, takes the position that
the FDA’s decision not to require a label change prior to October 2010
reflected the FDA’s ‘determin[ation]’ that a new warning ‘should [not]
be included in the labeling of the drug.’”89
Justices Alito, Kavanaugh, and Chief Justice Roberts concluded that
failure-to-warn claims against Merck should be preempted because
“for years the FDA was: aware of this [warning] issue, communicating
with drug manufacturers, studying all relevant information, and
instructing healthcare professionals and patients alike to continue to
use Fosamax as directed.”90 These “extensive” communications by the
FDA provided “clear evidence” that the FDA would not approve a
change in Fosamax’s warning; an agency determination that warranted
preemptive effect under Wyeth.91
II. NAVIGATING THE CONTOURS OF BRANDED DRUG PREEMPTION TODAY

Although the Supreme Court’s primary holding in Albrecht—that
judges, not juries, must make pharmaceutical preemption
determinations—is fairly straightforward, there are a number of
outstanding issues that will likely play out in lower courts in the wake
of the decision. The Court even acknowledged that it accepted review
of Albrecht in light of “differences and uncertainties among the courts
of appeals and state supreme courts in respect to the application of
Wyeth” and the “clear evidence” exception, and that the Court’s
decision to remand the case centered on the “determinative question”
of the required decisionmaker without articulating precisely what will,
and will not, satisfy the “clear evidence” exception.92 Nevertheless,
the Court did “elaborate Wyeth’s requirements along the way” to help
guide judges in their preemption analysis.93
A. Pragmatism Should Govern Whether the “Clear Evidence”
Exception Is Satisfied
The most important outstanding issue following Albrecht is what
communication, action, or inaction by the FDA is sufficient to satisfy the
“clear evidence” exception. As indicated in Part I, members of the Court
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. (quoting FDA Safety Announcement).
Id. (quoting Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae).
Id.
Id. at 1685.
Id. at 1676, 1679 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1676.
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had differing opinions on this issue. Justice Thomas supported the
requirement of a formal FDA ruling explicitly rejecting a proposed
warning change, leaving no doubts whatsoever, while Justices Alito,
Kavanaugh, and Chief Justice Roberts supported a more flexible approach
that considers the full scope of the branded drug manufacturer’s
interactions and communications with the FDA.94
The majority of the Court expressed the “clear evidence” exception as
requiring “evidence that shows the court that the drug manufacturer fully
informed the FDA of the justifications for the warning required by state
law and that the FDA, in turn, informed the drug manufacturer that the
FDA would not approve a change to the drug’s label to include that
warning.”95 This formulation, similar to that of Justices Alito,
Kavanaugh, and Chief Justice Roberts, focuses on the exchange of
information between the FDA and branded drug manufacturer. It omits
an express requirement of a formal agency ruling rejecting a
manufacturer’s preapproval application to change a warning or
subsequent rejection of a manufacturer’s unilateral warning change made
pursuant to the CBE process. In this regard, the Court appeared to adopt
a more practical or functional approach to whether the FDA’s
communications signal disapproval of a proposed warning change.
Such a practical approach is also more consistent with the Court’s
primary holding to vest the preemption analysis exclusively with judges
who “are better equipped to evaluate the nature and scope of an agency’s
determination.”96 Indeed, if the Court intended that the FDA needed to
make a formal ruling rejecting a proposed warning change or a warning
change effectuated by the manufacturer pursuant to the CBE process in
every circumstance, there would be little need for a preemption analysis.
Rather, by adopting the “fully informed” and “informed” terminology that
underscores the information exchange between the branded drug
manufacturer and the FDA as the standard for the “clear evidence”
exception, the Court appeared to envision a broader set of circumstances
in which the FDA’s communications would carry a preemptive effect. 97
The Court appeared to task judges with the preemption analysis precisely
because the answer may not always be “clear cut,” and “judges are better
suited than are juries to understand and to interpret agency decisions.”98
This practical approach additionally makes greater sense from a public
policy standpoint. If a branded drug manufacturer believes a change in a
drug’s warning is warranted, it has two options: 1) seek the FDA’s
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1672 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1680 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1672.
Id. at 1680.
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preapproval of a change to the drug’s existing approved warning by
submitting a PAS application; or 2) effectuate the change through the
CBE process.99 As discussed, Merck utilized both paths by first
submitting PAS applications, which resulted in the FDA communicating
its approval of a proposed change to Fosamax’s “Adverse Reactions”
section (but not to the drug’s “Precautions” section), before using the
CBE process to ultimately effectuate the change to the “Adverse
Reactions” section.100 If Merck, to obtain preemption, was required to
have included in its CBE application the changes to Fosamax’s
“Precautions” section for which the FDA consistently communicated its
disapproval and then await a formal, subsequent rejection by the FDA of
that warning change, the result would have been a series of inconsistent
warnings to prescribing physicians.
It is not difficult to imagine how problematic and disruptive such a
requirement would be. Risk-adverse branded drug manufacturers unsure
about a potential need for an added warning would have an incentive to
pursue warning changes more readily through the CBE process just so the
FDA formally repudiates the warning change after it has been made,
which would establish a clear basis to preempt failure-to-warn claims. As
a result, branded drug warnings could experience increased volatility
through back-and-forth labeling changes introduced by the manufacturer
and rejected by the FDA, creating confusion for prescribing physicians
and impeding patient safety.101
The FDA also appears to share this concern. In its brief in Albrecht,
the agency, speaking through the Solicitor General, indicated that the
FDA has historically “accepted PAS applications instead of CBE
supplements . . . particularly where significant questions exist on whether
to revise or how to modify existing drug labeling.”102 The agency’s
“Guidance for Industry” on safety labeling changes also states that
warning changes based on new safety information made pursuant to the
CBE process should be reserved for situations in which the
manufacturer’s proposed changes are “identical” to those for which the
FDA has communicated approval.103 “In all other situations,” the FDA

99. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b), (c) (2020); see also Gayle v. Pfizer Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 78, 85
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2020) (“Two avenues exist for manufacturers to update their drug labels.”).
100. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
101. See Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1673 (stating objective of FDA regulations to “exclude
‘[e]xaggeration of risk, or inclusion of speculative or hypothetical risks,’ that ‘could discourage
appropriate use of a beneficial drug’” (quoting Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes
for Approved Drugs, Biologics, & Med. Devices,73 Fed. Reg. 2848, 2851 (Jan. 16, 2008))); see also infra
notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
102. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1685 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting Brief of United States as Amicus
Curiae).
103. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ASS’N, CONTROL NO. 0910-0734, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: SAFETY
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has explained, the branded drug manufacturer should submit a PAS
application to “propose alternative labeling changes that reflect the new
safety information.”104 The public policy objective here is to promote
collaboration between the FDA and the branded drug manufacturer to
build “consensus on wording of the labeling change,” not encourage the
manufacturer to rely on the CBE process as a tool to force the FDA’s hand
into removing all doubts about the agency’s position for the purpose of a
“clear evidence” preemption analysis.105
Requiring a formal FDA rejection of a branded drug manufacturer’s
warning change effectuated through the CBE process would also prove
needlessly inefficient and wasteful where the FDA has made its position
known in its response to a manufacturer’s PAS application (which was
the case with Merck in Albrecht). The CBE process involves a
significant, costly undertaking for a branded drug manufacturer that
additionally stretches the FDA’s limited resources. It is intended to be
used “sparingly.”106 Pursuant to the CBE process, a branded drug
manufacturer endeavoring to “add or strengthen” a drug’s labeling must
prepare “a full explanation of the basis for the change” to reflect “newly
acquired information.”107 The newly acquired information must include
data, analyses, or other information that provide “reasonable evidence of
a causal association” of a “clinically significant adverse reaction[]” to a
drug;108 onerous requirements designed to protect against misuse or
overuse of the CBE process.109 At the very least, such an undertaking
may be needlessly duplicative of a PAS application, which among other
LABELING CHANGES – IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 505(O)(4) OF THE FD&C ACT, 7 (2013), available
at https://www.fda.gov/media/116594/download.
104. Id. (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 11.
106. McGrath v. Bayer HealthCare Pharm., Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 161, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“[T]he
FDA contemplated that the CBE regulation would be used sparingly, noting it ‘would not allow a change
to labeling to add a warning in the absence of reasonable evidence of an association between the product
and an adverse event.’”) (quoting Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved
Drugs, Biologics, & Med. Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. at 2851)).
107. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(3), (6)(iii). “Newly acquired information is data, analyses, or other
information not previously submitted to the Agency, which may include (but is not limited to) data derived
from clinical studies, reports of adverse events, or new analyses of previously submitted data (e.g., metaanalyses) if the studies, events, or analyses reveal risks of a different type or greater severity or frequency
than previously included in submissions to the FDA.” 21 C.F.R. § 314.3.
108. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i); see also Utts v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 251 F. Supp. 3d 644,
659 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), aff'd sub nom. Gibbons v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 919 F.3d 699 (2d Cir. 2019)
(“[T]he CBE regulation requires that there be sufficient evidence of a causal association between the drug
and the information sought to be added.”).
109. See Merck Sharpe & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1673 (2019) (stating these
requirements are meant to “exclude [e]xaggeration of risk, or inclusion of speculative or hypothetical
risks,’ that ‘could discourage appropriate use of a beneficial drug’”) (quoting Supplemental Applications
Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, & Med. Devices,73 Fed. Reg. at 2851)); see
also infra Part II.B (discussing CBE regulation).
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things similarly requires the branded drug manufacturer to package a
“detailed description of the proposed change,” a “description of the
methods used and studies performed to assess the effects of the change”
and the “data derived from such studies.”110
Even before Albrecht was decided, courts recognized that the “plain
language” of Wyeth does not support the “contention that manufacturer
submission and express rejection of a proposed warning is required to
satisfy the clear evidence standard.”111 Rather, the “relevant inquiry in
each conflict preemption case since [Wyeth v.] Levine is stated as whether
the FDA would have rejected a proposed labeling change, not whether the
FDA did in fact issue an explicit rejection.”112 Wyeth’s clear evidence
exception, therefore, “necessarily considers instances where a
manufacturer has not submitted a labeling change to the FDA.”113
Early judicial interpretations of Albrecht suggest a pragmatic approach
that examines the totality of the communications between the FDA and
branded drug manufacturer, and does not require a formal or explicit FDA
rejection, is becoming more deeply entrenched. For example, in 2020, a
federal district court in Missouri determined that failure-to-warn claims
against the manufacturer of the branded blood thinner Pradaxa, which was
approved by the FDA in 2010 to reduce the risk of stroke and blood clots
in patients with atrial fibrillation, were preempted pursuant to the “clear
evidence” exception.114 Here, plaintiffs sued the manufacturer for
allegedly failing to add stronger warnings about the risk of bleeding.115
The court found the claims preempted not based on any specific action by
the FDA, but rather “in light of the known issues and the ongoing giveand-take between [the branded drug manufacturer] and the FDA on these
issues.”116
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that several studies of Pradaxa after
it obtained FDA approval and a more detailed label for the drug’s sale in
the European Union constituted “newly acquired information” requiring
110. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(3).
111. See Seufert v. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp., 187 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1169 (S.D. Cal. 2016); see
also Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1213-16 (D. Utah 2016) (“Courts have universally
rejected the notion that Levine requires a showing that the manufacturer attempted to apply the warning
suggested by the plaintiff but that the labeling was ultimately rejected by the FDA.”), rev’d on other
grounds, 855 F.3d 1091 (10th Cir. 2017).
112. Seufert, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1169 (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 1170; see also id. (“Courts in this Circuit and others have considered several factors in
assessing conflict preemption, including the regulatory history of the drug or drug class at issue, temporal
gaps between FDA action and accrual of a plaintiff’s claims, citizen petition submissions and rejections,
available scientific data, and whether the FDA has reviewed the particular harm at issue and the
consistency of any resulting conclusions.”).
114. Ridings v. Maurice, 444 F. Supp. 3d 973, 981-83, 998 (W.D. Mo. 2020).
115. See id. at 988.
116. Id.
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the manufacturer to add stronger U.S. warnings pursuant to the CBE
process.117 The court determined that this information, while helpful, did
not provide conclusive new safety information because the FDA had
always “understood that the use of Pradaxa presented a trade-off between
an increased risk of stroke and an increased risk of major bleeding” based
on different dosages.118 The court went further, though, in stating that
even if the information cited by the plaintiffs constituted “newly acquired
information,” the branded drug manufacturer “offered sufficient ‘clear
evidence’ that the FDA . . . nonetheless would have rejected the
warning(s).”119
The court explained that the FDA had contemporaneously reviewed the
studies cited by the plaintiff, as well as other information provided to the
agency by the branded drug manufacturer, and consistently declined to
pursue additional warnings.120 In light of this ongoing study and
cooperation with the branded drug manufacturer, the court held that “the
FDA’s continued inaction does represent clear evidence.”121
A federal district court in Louisiana reached a similar conclusion in
another case decided within a year of Albrecht.122 The plaintiff alleged
various tort claims, including failure-to-warn, against the manufacturer of
the branded drug MultiHance, a Gadolinium-Based Contrast Agent
(GBCA) approved by the FDA in 2004 for intravenuous injection to
create clearer, sharper images in MRI and MRA scans.123 The plaintiff,
who experienced an adverse reaction after being injected with the drug,
argued that a specific warning about potential health risks of “gadolinium
retention” was required by the manufacturer. 124 The court rejected this
argument based on the absence of purported new safety risk information
requiring the branded drug manufacturer to change the warning, and
“more importantly” because there was “clear evidence that the FDA
would not have approved a warning about the alleged adverse health
consequences of a GBCA injection.”125
The court reached this conclusion not based on any FDA rejection of a
PAS application or CBE supplement by the branded drug manufacturer,

117. See id. at 993-94.
118. Id. at 993.
119. Id. at 998.
120. See id. at 993-98.
121. Id. at 998 (emphasis added). The court cautioned, however, that “it should not always be the
case that simple inaction by the FDA in light of submitted data will always be ‘clear evidence’ that the
FDA would reject a particular warning.” Id.
122. See Thomas v. Bracco Diagnostics Inc., No. 3:19-CV-00493, 2020 WL 1016273 (W.D. La.
Feb. 27, 2020).
123. See id. at *1.
124. See id. at *1, *6-8.
125. Id. at *10.
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but rather based on independent action by the agency. The FDA approved
a revised warning in 2018, about a month before the plaintiff’s injection,
which specifically addressed the presence of gadolinium retention in the
body.126
The added warning, however, stated that “clinical
consequences” of gadolinium retention had not been established.127
Because the “FDA had actually issued a revised warning informing the
medical community that retention occurred but specifically adding that
no causal relationship . . . has been established,” the court determined that
there was “clear evidence” the FDA would not have approved a proffered
labeling change specifying health risks of gadolinium retention.128
Courts have also found that the FDA’s denial of a citizen petition to
change a branded drug’s warning may be sufficient to establish “clear
evidence” that the agency would not approve a labeling change. As the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit explained, there is “nothing
in Wyeth or Albrecht excluding [a branded drug manufacturer] from
justifying preemption” where the FDA has rejected a petition by an entity
that is not the manufacturer. 129 Similarly, a North Dakota trial court stated
that it would be “nonsensical” to interpret Albrecht “so narrowly” as to
ignore the FDA’s denial of a citizen petition in applying the “clear
evidence” exception because “[r]egardless of who submitted the proposed
warning or labeling change, the FDA has already decided that the relevant
evidence and policies do not meet the standard to justify a change.”130
Such applications of the “clear evidence” exception following Albrecht
underscore the importance of an approach with flexibility to account for
the many ways modifications of branded drug warning labels occur in
practice. “Clear evidence,” as the Supreme Court explained, must not be
confused in this context with a heightened evidentiary burden or an
explicit showing that removes all doubt about whether a branded drug
manufacturer can comply with federal and state requirements. 131 The
Court’s refined standard avoided rigid or formalistic requirements to
focus the analysis on the information exchange with the FDA, namely
whether the agency was “fully informed” and in turn “informed” the
branded drug manufacturer of agency determinations. 132
This
126. See id. at *6, *10.
127. Id. at *6.
128. Id. at *10; see also Drescher v. Bracco Diagnostics Inc., No. CV-19-00096-TUC-RM (LCK),
2020 WL 699878, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 31, 2020) (stating that although the FDA ultimately required a label
change for GBCAs in 2018, “that label explicitly refutes a causal association”).
129. Cerveny v. Aventis, Inc., 783 Fed. Appx. 804, 808 n.9 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal
of plaintiffs’ state law failure-to-warn, fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims).
130. State v. Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 08-2018-CV-01300, 2019 WL 3776653, at *2 (N.D. Dist.
Ct. July 22, 2019).
131. See Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1679 (2019).
132. Id. at 1678.
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information contemplates “extensive communication” and an “ongoing
give-and-take” between the branded drug manufacturer and the agency
regardless of whether a warning change is ultimately effectuated by the
FDA approving a manufacturer’s PAS application, approving or rejecting
a manufacturer’s change made pursuant to the CBE process, or by the
agency acting on its own to adopt a warning change.133 It may also
include a negative inference in approved warning information as seen
with the GBCA MultiHance or the FDA’s denial of a third party’s citizen
petition to effectuate a warning change. Courts applying the “clear
evidence” exception should approach the preemption analysis with the
understanding that the exception is designed for function over form, and
that in the complex area of pharmaceutical regulation, FDA
communications, action, and inaction can demonstrate “clear evidence”
that the agency would not adopt a proffered warning change.
B. Conducting a Branded Drug Preemption Analysis

The Supreme Court’s effort in Albrecht to “elaborate” the “clear
evidence” exception raises the issue of how judges charged with a
branded drug preemption analysis are meant to fulfill that
responsibility. As discussed in the previous section, approaching this
responsibility with a sense of pragmatism and willingness to consider
the totality of the circumstances and information exchange between
the FDA and branded drug manufacturer is a key first step. But what
are each of the steps in a branded drug preemption analysis today?
Courts deciding whether a failure-to-warn claim against a branded
drug manufacturer is preempted often break down the analysis into two
parts.134 The first part examines whether the path identified in Wyeth
in which the branded drug manufacturer may unilaterally change an
FDA-approved warning––i.e. the CBE process––is even available to
the manufacturer.135 If the CBE process is not available, the rationale
set forth in Wyeth for allowing a claim against a branded drug
manufacturer fails, meaning the claim should be preempted because
the manufacturer cannot legally change a warning without FDA
approval.
Although the Court in Wyeth may have created an impression that a
133. Id. at 1685 (Alito, J., concurring); Ridings v. Maurice, 444 F. Supp. 3d 973, 998 (W.D. Mo.
2020).
134. See, e.g., Adkins v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. X03HHDCV1606065131S, 2020
WL 1890681, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2020) (discussing “two-pronged” nature of preemption
analysis); Gayle v. Pfizer Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 78, 87 (S.D. N.Y. 2020) (discussing plaintiffs’ failure to
satisfy “first step” of preemption analysis).
135. Adkins, 2020 WL 1890681, at *4 (stating that Albrecht maintained “the first, CBE prong of
the preemption test”).
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branded drug manufacturer is generally free to unilaterally change a
warning if and when it sees fit, FDA regulations make plain that the
circumstances are limited.136 As mentioned previously with respect to
the burdens associated with the CBE process, a branded drug
manufacturer can only pursue a warning change through the CBE
process in light of “newly acquired information.”137 Newly acquired
information is defined as “data, analyses, or other information not
previously submitted to the [FDA],” which means a branded drug
manufacturer’s unilateral warning change cannot be predicated on
information the manufacturer has already supplied the agency in
obtaining initial approval of a branded drug’s warning or a subsequent
approval or rejection of a revised warning.138 Newly acquired
information may include “data derived from new clinical studies,
reports of adverse events, or new analyses of previously submitted data
(e.g., meta-analyses) if the studies, events, or analyses reveal risks of
a different type or greater severity or frequency than previously
included in submissions to FDA.”139
In addition, the newly acquired information must provide
“reasonable evidence of a causal association” of a “clinically
significant adverse reaction[]” to a drug.140 A clinically significant
adverse reaction includes reactions that have a “significant impact on
therapeutic decision-making,” such as a risk that is “potentially fatal”
or “serious even if infrequent.”141 Therefore, new data or analyses that
evaluate adverse events or other impacts of a branded drug, but do not
136. See MacMurray v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. 2:17-CV-00195, 2017 WL
11496825, at *2 (D. Utah Dec. 17, 2017) (“The CBE regulation is restrictive . . . . Labeling changes
pursuant to the CBE regulation may only be made on the basis of ‘newly acquired information.’”).
137. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(3), (6)(iii) (2016).
138. 21 C.F.R. § 314:3(b) (2016); see also Roberto v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No.
CPLHHDCV166068484S, 2019 WL 5068452, at *13 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2019) (“[A]ny claim
that a drug label should be changed based solely on ‘information previously submitted to the FDA is
preempted because the CBE regulation cannot be used to make a label change based on such
information.’”) (quoting In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig., 185
F. Supp. 3d 761, 769 (D.S.C. 2016)).
139. 21 C.F.R. § 314.3(b) (2016) (emphasis added). The newly acquired information must also
accomplish one of five statutory objectives, including a change to: 1) “add or strengthen a
contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction”; 2) “add or strengthen a statement about drug
abuse, dependence, psychological effect, or overdosage”; 3) “add or strengthen an instruction about
dosage and administration”; 4) “delete false, misleading, or unsupported indications for use or claims for
effectiveness”; and 5) “Any labeling change normally requiring a supplement submission and approval
prior to distribution of the drug product that FDA specifically requests be submitted under this provision.”
21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2016).
140. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2015); see also Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d
387, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) (“It is technically a violation of federal law to propose a CBE that is not based
on reasonable evidence.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
141. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and
Biological Products,71 Fed. Reg. 3922-01, 3946 (Jan. 24, 2006); 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6)(i) (2015).
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expressly identify a causal association to a clinically significant
adverse reaction, are irrelevant to a preemption analysis because they
offer no actionable intelligence that would enable the manufacturer to
pursue a warning change pursuant to the CBE process. 142
As the Supreme Court recognized in Albrecht, the limitations set
forth in the CBE process serve to “exclude ‘[e]xaggeration of risk, or
inclusion of speculative or hypothetical risks,’ that ‘could discourage
appropriate use of a beneficial drug.’”143 A plaintiff pursuing a failureto-warn claim against a branded drug manufacturer thus bears the
initial burden of demonstrating the existence of newly acquired
information for which the manufacturer failed to act upon by pursuing
a unilateral warning change through the CBE process. 144
A number of branded drug preemption cases decided in the wake of
Albrecht have turned on the sufficiency of purported newly acquired
information. For example, in 2020, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York rejected failure-to-warn claims involving
the FDA-approved cholesterol-lowering drug Lipitor.145 Plaintiffs’
alleged that Lipitor’s manufacturer needed to include specific warnings
about the risk of type-2 diabetes, citing some 6,000 adverse event
reports.146 The court determined that adverse event reports that merely
“describe instances where patients taking Lipitor were diagnosed with
type 2 diabetes but do not reach any conclusions regarding a causal
association . . . . cannot constitute ‘newly acquired information’” under a
“plain reading” of the FDA’s regulations. 147
In finding the claims preempted, the court recognized that the CBE
requirement that newly acquired information show “a basis to believe
there is a causal relationship between the drug and the occurrence of the
adverse event” provides a “backstop to prevent manufacturers from
142. See, e.g., In re Celexa & Lexapro Mktg. & Sales Pracs. Litig., 779 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2015)
(finding claim preempted because label change not allowed under CBE regulation absent “newly acquired
information”).
143. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1673 (2019) (quoting 73 Fed. Reg.
2848, 2851 (2008)).
144. See Adkins v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. X03HHDCV1606065131S, 2020 WL
1890681, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2020) (“[T]he burden of going forward and identifying the
purported newly acquired information must fall on the plaintiff because ‘it would be virtually impossible
for the defendants to prove a negative and negate the existence of newly acquired information without
knowing exactly what newly acquired information the plaintiff relies upon.’”) (quoting Roberto v.
Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., No. CPLHHDCV166068484S, 2019 WL 5068452, at *11 n.9 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2019)).
145. See Gayle v. Pfizer Inc., 452 F. Supp. 3d 78, 87-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).
146. See id. at 88.
147. Id. The court additionally rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that adverse event reports which
“offer no analysis” could be sufficient to shift the burden onto the manufacturer to demonstrate “clear
evidence” that the FDA would have rejected plaintiffs’ proffered warning change without satisfying the
first part of the preemption analysis. Id.
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warning of every possible adverse reaction in an effort to insulate
themselves from any conceivable liability.”148 “Over-disclosure,” the
court cautioned, “dilutes warnings of more significant adverse reactions
both by likelihood and severity of the reaction and can unjustifiably deter
patients from a helpful drug or therapy.”149 Consequently, new
information “without any analysis indicating causality” is inadequate and
“misses the mark.”150
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York reached a
similar conclusion shortly after Albrecht was decided in a case involving
another GBCA branded as Magnevist.151 Here, a plaintiff argued that
Magnevist, which was approved by the FDA in 1988, required a specific
warning about gadolinium retention resulting in fibrosis in light of several
medical studies.152 The court found that the plaintiff’s failure-to-warn
“allegations focus on gadolinium retention, which is not, by itself, [a]
‘clinically significant adverse reaction,’” were unaccompanied by data
establishing “the requisite causal connection” to an actual risk of harm.153
“Studies concluding it ‘remains unknown whether GBCAs induce toxic
effects’ and that ‘further studies are required to address possible clinical
consequences of gadolinium deposition,’” the court explained, “do not
constitute reasonable or well-grounded scientific evidence of ‘clinically
significant adverse effects’ under the CBE regulation.”154 For instance,
in dismissing one of the studies proffered by plaintiff as “newly acquired
information,” the court reasoned that a “single study performed on mice
does not make a risk ‘apparent’ or otherwise constitute ‘reasonable
evidence of an association’ between Magnevist and fibrosis.”155 As the
court appreciated, “to ensure that only ‘scientifically accurate information
appears in the approved labeling’ the FDA prefers a more cautious
approach, and finds that because ‘labeling that includes theoretical
hazards not well-grounded in scientific evidence can cause meaningful
risk information to lose its significance,’ there must be ‘sufficient
evidence of a causal association between the drug and the information
sought to be added.’”156

148. Id. at 85 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(7)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 88.
151. See McGrath v. Bayer HealthCare Pharms. Inc., 393 F. Supp. 3d 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).
152. See id. at 165.
153. Id. at 168.
154. Id. at 169-70.
155. Id. at 170.
156. Id. at 169 (quoting Utts v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 251 F. Supp. 3d 644, 659 (S.D.N.Y.
2017)) (emphasis in original); see also Klein v. Bayer Healthcare Pharms. Inc., No. 2:18-cv-01424-APGEJY, 2019 WL 3945652, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 21, 2019) (“[Plaintiff] does not plead facts showing that
Bayer had or should have had newly acquired information permitting it to unilaterally add her desired
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If a plaintiff can demonstrate the existence of “newly acquired
information” with the requisite evidence of a causal association to support
a labeling change under the CBE regulation, the second part of the
preemption analysis shifts the burden to the branded drug manufacturer
to show “clear evidence” that the FDA would not have approved the
proffered labeling change based on that information.157 As discussed, the
branded manufacturer at this stage should be permitted to rely on the
information the FDA had at its disposal and the totality of the
communications between the agency and manufacturer to establish that
the agency was “fully informed” of justifications supporting a different
warning to comply with state law.158 A similar pragmatic approach to the
information exchange should also apply to the FDA’s communications
that “inform” the branded drug manufacturer that the agency will not
approve an altered warning.159 Subsequent action to reject a potential
warning change or continued inaction by the FDA should additionally
serve as sufficient evidence that the “fully informed” agency has made a
determination not to alter a warning, which “informed” the manufacturer
for the purposes of satisfying “clear evidence” under Albrecht.160
The Court in Albrecht charged judges with making these
determinations because they are “better suited than are juries to
understand and to interpret agency decisions” and the import of the FDA’s
communications that “memorialize its considered judgments.”161 Judges
are well-suited to discern whether the FDA’s communications with a
branded drug manufacturer are intended to foreclose further deliberation
about a potential warning charge (and carry a preemptive effect), or
accomplish some other objective such as seeking greater information
about a potential drug risk or continuing a dialogue about potential
labeling changes.162 Judges should not be limited in their analysis to only
formal FDA decisions and forced to turn a blind eye to what might be
repeated, glaring indications by the agency to a manufacturer that a drug’s
warnings should not be changed. Such an approach would undermine the
purpose of having a judge perform a branded drug preemption analysis.
Judges should also appreciate that a pragmatic approach to deciding
whether clear evidence exists that the FDA would not approve a warning
change promotes the development of safer drugs. It avoids the creation
warning under the CBE regulation.”).
157. See Utts, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 661.
158. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1678 (2019).
159. See supra Part II.A.
160. See supra Part II.A.
161. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1680.
162. See, e.g., In re Avandia Mkg., Sales & Prods. Liab. Litig., 945 F.3d 749, 759 (3d Cir. 2019)
(finding that the FDA’s response letter to a proposed change sought additional information from
manufacturer such that the agency was not “fully informed” and had not rejected the proposal).
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of unsound incentives for branded drug manufacturers to pursue
unnecessary FDA rulings that formally reject every conceivable warning
change simply to obtain a surefire preemption defense where the agency
has made its position clear by telling the manufacturer to “hold off” or
that the science “does not provide a clear path forward” for a labeling
change.163 This concern becomes more pronounced and antithetical to
drug safety where a branded drug manufacturer is placed in the position
of having to use the CBE process to unilaterally implement a warning
change to protect itself from potentially massive liability exposure, and
the FDA subsequently reverses that decision. The result may be needless
inconsistency in the warnings provided to prescribing physicians that can
cause confusion, or possibly excessive warnings that dilute more
significant warnings or cause physicians to disregard other warnings. The
FDA, meanwhile, is forced to exhaust its limited resources to respond;
resources that could otherwise be devoted to evaluating the risks of other
drugs and advancing drug safety. 164
III. THE ROLE OF PREEMPTION FOR FDA-APPROVED DRUGS

The Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht supplements a legal
environment in which failure-to-warn claims related to the vast
majority of U.S. drug prescriptions are preempted under federal law.165
Congress has established such a regime to further various public policy
objectives, perhaps most notably the inexpensive development of
generic drugs that comprise the vast majority of drug prescriptions.166
Congress has appreciated that having lay juries across fifty states
“second guess” the labeling cost-benefit analysis of the expert agency
responsible for ensuring drug safety and efficacy may not necessarily
improve drug safety. Nevertheless, with respect to branded drugs that
are typically newer products, Congress has determined that the value
of having juries provide a separate means of ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness is a worthwhile “layer of consumer protection that
complements FDA regulation.”167 Of course, as the Supreme Court
has recognized, “Congress and the FDA retain the authority to change
the law and regulations if they so desire.”168
Doctrines such as the “clear evidence” exception fit within this
163. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. at 1685-86 (quoting case record).
164. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 (2009) (stating that the “FDA has limited resources
to monitor the 11,000 drugs on the market”).
165. See supra Part I.A.
166. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
167. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 579.
168. Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 626 (2011).
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framework to remove any second guessing of the FDA’s
determinations where the agency has made its position known not to
approve a warning change and has effectively placed the branded drug
manufacturer in a box. It follows that the manufacturer that has been
informed of the FDA’s position not to approve a warning change
should not be required to engage in a fruitless pursuit to unilaterally
change a warning only to have the FDA override that change.
A significant public policy reason for this approach is that the cost
of developing a branded drug and bringing it to market is already an
enormously expensive undertaking. Some studies estimate the
average research and development investment for a new drug at around
$1.3 billion, with other studies suggesting total costs closer to $3
billion.169 These costs reflect the fact that most drug treatments fail to
obtain FDA approval and represent a sunk cost for the manufacturer.170
The full research, development and approval process can also take 12
to 15 years, creating a relatively narrow window for the branded drug
manufacturer to recoup its investment where drug patents generally
end after 20 years.171
Allowing failure-to-warn claims against branded drug
manufacturers can impose substantial additional costs after a drug
obtains FDA approval and is marketed for sale. Every year, branded
drug manufacturers face thousands of lawsuits related to their
products. In 2020, pending product liability MDLs alone involved at
least twenty different drug products, consolidating tens of thousands
of cases in federal courts.172 Pharmaceutical product liability is
estimated to result in billions of dollars of added costs each year. 173
The substantial front-end investments and unpredictable back-end
liability costs create a challenging environment for new drug
innovation. Although competition from generic drug companies can
169. See Olivier J. Wouters, et al., Estimated Research and Development Investment Needed to
Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018, 323 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 844 (Mar. 3, 2020), available at
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2762311 (estimating a $1.3 billion mean research
and development investment to bring a new drug to market and referencing other studies that estimate a
$2.8 billion expense).
170. See id.
171. See Leigh Ann Anderson, FDA Drug Approval Process, DRUGS.COM (Apr. 13, 2020),
https://www.drugs.com/fda-approval-process.html (explaining the 12-to-15-year new drug development
process).
172. See Pending MDLs, U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. (May 15, 2020),
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/pending-mdls-0 (providing links to lists of MDLs organized under
different categories).
173. See Erin Bosman et al., $4 Billion Price Tag for Pleasing Plaintiffs’ Bar? New Study Estimates
Costs of FDA’s Proposed Rule on Generic Drug Labeling, JD SUPRA (Feb. 26, 2014),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/4-billion-price-tag-for-pleasing-plaint-15927/ (discussing analysis
of proposed rule change to subject generic drug companies to failure-to-warn liability and estimating the
increased product liability cost at $4 billion annually).
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prove beneficial in enabling consumers to obtain life-saving
medications more cheaply, it can also result in an uneven playing field
where the branded drug company must absorb all product liability
(even after its drug patent expires) and the generic drug company is
generally free of that concern. In addition, the branded drug
manufacturer bears responsibility and costs related to post-sale
monitoring of its drug and ensuring the FDA has updated information
about adverse drug reactions or potential newly discovered drug
risks.174 Therefore, for a branded drug manufacturer, the availability
of a preemption defense is critical to mitigating the least predictable
burdens and costs associated with the development of a drug
innovation.
This unpredictability has also increased in recent years. A few
courts have expanded state tort law to subject a branded drug
manufacturer to liability for injury to a person who consumed a generic
drug manufacturer’s product. These “innovator liability” theories
argue that because a branded drug manufacturer (i.e. innovator)
created the branded version of a drug and obtained FDA approval of
the warning that generic drug manufacturers are required by law to
copy, the branded drug manufacturer should be subject to warning
liability for any harm resulting from a generic version of that drug.175
In 2014, the Alabama Supreme Court became the first state high
court to adopt an innovator liability theory, but the decision was shortlived and effectively overturned by the Alabama Legislature the
following year.176 Since that time, several other courts have accepted
innovator liability theories. For example, in 2017, the California
Supreme Court held that a branded drug manufacturer may be subject
to liability where the plaintiff consumed a generic version of the drug,
even where the branded drug manufacturer had completely divested its
interests in the branded drug six years before the plaintiff’s injury.177
In 2018, Massachusetts’ high court similarly embraced innovator
liability where a branded drug manufacturer acts recklessly with
respect to its duty to update labeling that a generic drug competitor

174. See Step 5: FDA Post-Market Drug Safety Monitoring, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 4,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/patients/drug-development-process/step-5-fda-post-market-drug-safetymonitoring#Active_Surveillance (discussing drug manufacturer post-sale monitoring duty).
175. See Victor E. Schwartz, et al., Warning: Shifting Liability to Manufacturers of Brand-Name
Medicines When the Harm was Allegedly Caused by Generic Drugs has Severe Side Effects, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1835 (2013).
176. See ALA. CODE ANN. § 6-5-530(a) (2020) (superseding Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, 159 So. 3d 649
(Ala. 2014), effectively reversing the Alabama Supreme Court’s adoption of the innovator liability
theory).
177. See T.H. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 407 P.3d 18 (Cal. 2017).
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copies.178
The vast majority of courts, however, have rejected innovator
liability theories, recognizing they are antithetical to a basic principle
of product liability that an entity is not liable for injuries caused by a
competitor’s product.179 For example, in rejecting such a theory, the
Iowa Supreme Court referred to innovator liability as “Deep pocket
jurisprudence” that is “law without principle.”180 The court also
expressed concerns about the potential for subjecting branded drug
manufacturers to limitless liability, stating it would instead continue to
adhere to “bedrock principles” and not “contort Iowa’s tort law in
order to create liability . . . .”181
Nevertheless, the threat of further judicial adoption of innovator
liability theories places greater pressure and uncertainty on the branded
drug manufacturers that develop society’s drug innovations. The
critical importance of these innovations, and threats posed by
excessive liability, are also amplified in times of health crisis, for
example the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. Doctrines such as
the “clear evidence” exception provide an avenue of relief to
innovating drug manufacturers to at least curb their liability exposure
where the FDA has indicated the manufacturer has acted responsibly
with respect to its warning obligation. A pragmatic approach to
judicial applications of the “clear evidence” exception following
Albrecht represents sound public policy because it provides liability
protection in a fair manner that does not effectively disregard what
might be years of “extensive communication” and collaboration
178. See Rafferty v. Merck & Co., Inc., 92 N.E.3d 1205, 1219 (Mass. 2018) (“[A] brand-name
manufacturer that controls the contents of the label on a generic drug owes a duty to consumers of that
generic drug not to act in reckless disregard of an unreasonable risk of death or grave bodily injury.”).
179. See, e.g., McNair v. Johnson & Johnson, 818 S.E.2d 852, 867 (W. Va. 2018) (“[T]here is no
cause of action in West Virginia for failure to warn and negligent misrepresentation against a brand-name
drug manufacturer when the drug ingested was produced by a generic drug manufacturer.”), aff’d per
curiam, 773 F.App’x 681 (4th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal after remand from West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals); Johnson v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 758 F.3d 605, 614-16 (5th Cir. 2014) (finding
plaintiff’s innovator liability claims against branded drug manufacturer foreclosed under Louisiana
Products Liability Act (LPLA)); Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1994)
(“Maryland law requires a plaintiff seeking to recover for an injury by a product to demonstrate that the
defendant manufactured the product at issue.”); In Re: Zantac (Ranitidine) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No.
2924, 2020 WL 7866660 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 31, 2020) (concluding that “none of the 35 jurisdictions that the
Court analyzed would recognize Plaintiffs’ theory of liability under which Defendants may be held liable
for injuries sustained by Plaintiffs’ ingestion of a product that Defendants did not manufacture, sell, or
distributed”).
180. See Huck v. Wyeth, Inc., 850 N.W.2d 353, 380 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Schwartz et al., supra
note 175, at 1871); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, Iowa High Court Exposes Pharma
‘Innovator Liability’ for What it Is: Deep-Pocket Jurisprudence, LEGAL OP. LETTERS (Wash. Legal
Found., D.C.), Sept. 12, 2014, at 1, available at https://www.wlf.org/2014/09/12/publishing/iowa-highcourt-exposes-pharma-innovator-liability-for-what-it-is-deep-pocket-jurisprudence/ (discussing cases).
181. Huck, 850 N.W.2d at 380.
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between a branded drug manufacturer and the FDA.182
The availability of preemption for warning claims involving generic
drugs, vaccines, and branded drugs where the “clear evidence”
exception is satisfied raises an issue that drives all pharmaceutical
litigation: how should the law deal with individuals who have suffered
injury from taking a drug, but may be left uncompensated? Again,
failure-to-warn claims related to generic drugs that comprise the vast
majority of U.S. prescriptions are preempted, meaning that most
individuals injured by an FDA-approved drug cannot recover from the
manufacturer.183 This situation is why plaintiffs’ attorneys have
resorted to asserting innovator liability theories that try to shift blame
to a branded drug manufacturer that not only did not make the product
that allegedly caused injury, but is often competing directly with the
generic drug manufacturer that did.184 If a tortured expansion of
product liability law offers an unjust and unprincipled way to address
the problem of uncompensated plaintiffs, what might be a solution?
The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VICP)
provides an example of a system that strikes a balance between
promoting the broad use of vaccines and accounting for injuries that
may result where claims against the drug manufacturer are
preempted.185 Pursuant to this system, an individual injured by an
FDA-approved vaccine can file a claim with a no-fault victim
compensation fund.186 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the
VICP is “designed to work faster and with greater ease than the civil
tort system” by providing for informal adjudication of injury claims
and reducing the legal requirements for a claimant to obtain a
recovery.187
The VICP, which is funded by an excise tax on each purchased dose
of a covered vaccine, was adopted precisely because lawsuits against
vaccine manufacturers and health care providers “threatened to cause
vaccine shortages and reduce U.S. vaccination rates, which could have
caused a resurgence of vaccine preventable diseases.”188 By generally
preempting all design and warning claims and channeling injury
182. Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 139 S. Ct. 1668, 1684-86 (2019) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
183. See STATISTA.COM, supra note 23.
184. See Schwartz et al., supra note 175.
185. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN.,
https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/index.html (last updated Nov. 2020) (outlining vaccine
injury compensation program).
186. See id.
187. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223, 228 (2011) (quoting Shalala v. Whitecotton, 514
U.S. 268, 269 (1995)).
188. See National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, supra note 185.
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claims into a no fault compensation system, the VICP has played a
vital role in stabilizing the production and broad use of vaccines.189
A similar approach might provide a balanced solution with respect
to the development of drugs other than vaccines. Such an approach
would require legislation, and would surely involve greater scope and
complexity, but would get to the heart of the compensation issue. It
could do so without undermining the benefits federal law provides
through preemption; benefits that include having an expert federal
agency set forth labeling requirements in a manner uninhibited by
potentially inconsistent lay jury determinations, promoting the
continued development of inexpensive generic drugs, and advancing
drug innovations through more predictable costs and liability
exposure.
Although the specifics of a compensation fund model are beyond
the scope of this Article, policymakers searching for an optimal
balance of competing public policies may find value in it. Judges
tasked with preemption determinations, on the other hand, must apply
the law as it exists and leave any future regime change to Congress.
With respect to the “clear evidence” exception, the Supreme Court has
articulated an approach for judges that fairly balances the competing
policy interests under the current liability system.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht resolved several important
outstanding issues regarding the application of the “clear evidence”
exception, but also left open precisely what evidence will suffice to show
that the FDA would not have approved a labeling change to a branded
drug. The Court held that such determinations must be made by judges,
not juries, and provided guidance to judges on how to conduct a modern
branded drug preemption analysis. This analysis focuses on the exchange
of information between the FDA and the branded drug manufacturer to
assess whether the manufacturer “fully informed” the agency of the
justifications for a warning change and whether the FDA “informed” the
manufacturer that the agency would not approve a warning change.
Judges applying this standard should adopt a pragmatic and flexible
approach that looks at the totality of the FDA’s communications, action
or inaction to determine whether the agency has made its position clear,
and avoid any rigid approach that considers only formal agency rulings.
An overly narrow approach would ignore circumstances in which the
189. See Emily Levine & Andrea Davey, The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and
Maternal Immunizations, 11 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 32, 39 (2017) (“Very few cases have been filed
and pursued against vaccine manufacturers or administrators in post-VICP civil litigation.”).
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FDA has made plain its position not to change a drug’s labeling, and
invite adverse consequences that can impair physicians’ ability to
properly prescribe drug treatments and impede safety improvements. A
pragmatic approach also strikes a fairer balance in reducing unpredictable
liability costs for branded drug manufacturers that can hinder new drug
innovations. Albrecht provides judges with a sound path forward for
making reasonable preemption determinations and is up to them to
implement it.
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